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 RESTORING REGULATORY CREDIBILITY AND PREVENTING “REPO RUNS”:  
A CAUTIONARY TALE 
 
HARRY McVEA1 
 
Abstract: 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis (‘GFC’), policy-makers and regulators have been 
engaged in Herculean efforts to restore their tarnished reputations. These efforts have involved 
jettisoning much of their flawed ideological baggage of old, rooted in a belief about the self-
correcting nature of markets and the ability of financial institutions to police themselves, and, in 
turn, building new, more muscular regulatory and supervisory regimes. This ongoing process is 
explored through the lens of a high-profile facet of shadow banking, namely the regulation of 
sale and repurchase agreements (so-called ‘repos’). Here, regulators have set out to address a 
key vulnerability associated with the maturity mismatch between the short-term liabilities of the 
repo borrower and its longer-term assets, which has the potential to trigger a so-called ‘repo 
run’. Through a review of a series of highly problematic reform options, the discussion indicates 
that there is a danger that regulators will repeat the mistakes of the past by substituting their 
misplaced faith, pre-GFC, in the self-correcting power of markets, with a misguided conviction, 
post-crisis, in their capacities to build regulatory regimes which can contain the risks associated 
with modern-day financial markets. It is suggested that such over-confidence is liable to lull us 
into a false sense of security about how robust these regimes really are, and to cause regulators 
to shirk some of the more difficult questions which remain to be addressed. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The global financial crisis (‘GFC’) represented not just a damning indictment of the 
rapaciousness of modern-day financial markets, it also exposed glaring weaknesses in the way in 
which financial market policy was formulated and financial markets were regulated. In 
particular, opprobrium was heaped on policy-makers and regulators for designing and 
                                                          
1 Professor of Law, University of Bristol, and Senior Associate Research Fellow, Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies, University of London. I would like to thank Ardavan Arzandeh, Pat Capps, Marc Moore, and the EBLR’s 
anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. Any remaining errors are my own.  
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implementing regulatory and supervisory regimes which were too ‘light touch’, and which failed, 
spectacularly, to align the private interests of the financial institutions subjected to them, with the 
public good. In some quarters, this criticism extended to claims that regulators had been 
‘captured’ by the financial services sector over which they exercized authority.2 More broadly, 
however, a significant proportion of the blame for the crisis was attributed to ‘regulatory 
failure’.3 In this respect, few regulatory agencies––domestic, regional (ie ‘EU’), or international–
–escaped public censure. 
In the United Kingdom, the Financial Services Authority (‘FSA’)—in its day, one of the 
world’s most innovative regulators—was, post-crisis, subjected to a range of excoriating 
criticisms. In relation to Northern Rock, the FSA was said to have ‘fallen short of high 
professional standards in the execution of its supervisory approach’4 and to have ‘systematically 
failed in its regulatory duty to ensure that [the bank] would not pose a systemic risk.’ 5 And, in 
relation to its overly supine approach to regulation more generally, it was claimed that the 
regulator had prioritized ‘systems and processes’ over ‘challenging business models and 
strategies’;6 and, moreover, that it had exhibited neglect over the build-up of macro-prudential 
risk by focusing on the ‘supervision of individual institutions, [at the expense of] wider sectoral 
and system-wide risks.’7 These failures were further compounded by the identification of serious 
weaknesses in the ‘tripartite’ architecture, of which the FSA—as a ‘unified regulator’—was a 
principal part. According to the then Coalition Government, the Tripartite system failed to: (i) 
identify system-wide problems that lay dormant in the financial sector; (ii) take steps to mitigate 
                                                          
2 In the US context, see, eg, Simon Johnson and James Kwak, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Take Over and the Next 
Financial Meltdown (New York: Pantheon, 2010). In the UK context, see, eg, Sir Mervyn King, Joint Committee on 
the draft Financial Services Bill: Evidence (16 December, 2011) 206. And, at the international level, see, eg, 
Andrew Baker, Restraining regulatory capture? Anglo-America, crisis politics and trajectories of change in global 
financial governance 86(3) International Affairs 647 (2010). 
3 For example, see, House of Lords, House of Commons, Changing Banking for Good: Report of the Parliamentary 
Commission on Banking Standards  (First Report of Session 2013–14 Volume I: Summary, and Conclusions and 
recommendations,  June, 2013, HL Paper 27-I HC 175-I*) 11; Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Report (2011) (available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic final-
report_full.pdf) (hereinafter “FCIC Report”) xviii; House of Commons Treasury Committee, Banking Crisis: 
dealing with the failure of the UK banks (Seventh Report of Session 2008–09, HC 416) 3; and Robert C Altman, 
The Great Crash, 2008 (Jan-Feb), Foreign Affairs 2, 8 (2009). 
4 The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (London: FSA, March 2009) (para 
2.6(ii)) (hereinafter, “Turner Review”) (para 2.7.(i)). 
5 House of Commons Treasury Committee, The Run on the Rock (Seventh Report of Session 2007–08, HC (2007-
08) 56-I (footnote omitted). 
6 Turner Review, supra n. 4. 
7 Ibid., para 2.6(ii). 
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these problems before they led to significant financial market instability; and (iii) deal 
adequately with the unfolding crisis, especially during the summer of 2007.8 Following sweeping 
changes to the tripartite system, the coup de grace for the FSA was its abolition in April 2013.9  
In the United States, regulatory arrangements and regulators fared little better. Regulatory 
arrangements were, for example, widely regarded as having been overly fragmented, focusing 
more on individual firms than on system-wide systemic risk. According to the US Government 
Accountability Office (“GAO”), the 2007-2009 financial crisis highlighted the ‘lack of an 
agency or mechanism responsible for monitoring and addressing risks across the financial 
system’10 and illustrated how the ‘fragmented’ nature of US regulation had ‘contributed to 
failures … to adequately protect consumers and ensure financial stability.’11 Federal regulators, 
meanwhile, were castigated for fostering a culture of ‘pervasive permissiveness’,12 and for 
‘forging a deregulatory climate that allowed reckless loans to flourish’.13 The Federal Reserve, in 
particular, drew fire for its ‘pivotal failure to stem the flow of toxic mortgages’14 and for its 
failure to fulfill its ‘statutory obligation to establish and maintain prudent mortgage lending 
standards [as well as] to protect against predatory lending.’15 In addition, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (‘SEC’), long regarded as a competent and well-resourced regulator,16 
attracted criticism for its ‘record of regulatory abdication’ and poor decision-making,17 of which 
the ‘Madoff Affair’ was perhaps the most high-profile example.18  
                                                          
8 HM Treasury,  A New Approach to Financial Regulation: Judgement, Focus And Stability (July 2010, CM 7874) 
(paras 1.3-1.6). 
9 See, Eilis Ferran, The Break-up of the Financial Services Authority 31(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1 
(2011).  
10 GAO, Financial Regulation: Complex and Fragmented Structure Could Be Streamlined to Improve Effectiveness 
(Feb. 2016) (GAO-16-175) (Highlights). 
11 GAO, Financial Regulation: A Framework for Crafting and Assessing Proposals to Modernize the Outdated U.S. 
Financial Regulatory System (Jan. 2009) (GAO-09-216) 55; and Michael W Taylor, ‘Twin Peaks’ Revisited: A 
Second Chance for Regulatory Reform (Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation, Sept. 2009) 4. 
12 FCIC Report, supra n. 3, xvii. 
13 Patricia A McCoy, Andrey D Pavlov, and Susan M Wachter, Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of 
Deregulation and Regulatory Failure 41 Conn L Rev 1,327, 1,343 (2009). 
14 FCIC Report, supra n. 3, xvii.  
15 FCIC Report, ibid., 101.  
16 Robert A Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC 91 Cornell L Rev 775 (2006) (‘most commentators consider 
the SEC an extremely successful regulator’ (800, footnote omitted)). 
17 See, eg, McCoy et al, supra n. 13, 1,344, and 1,357; and the FCIC Report, supra n. 3, 187, and 291. 
18 See, eg, Cheryl Nichols, Addressing Inept SEC Enforcement Efforts: Lessons from Madoff, the Hedge Fund 
Industry, and Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act for US and Global Financial Systems 31 Nw J Int’l L & Bus 637, 661 
(2011). 
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Unsurprisingly, similar regulatory deficiencies were also detected at the EU and 
international levels. In Europe, the ‘de Larosière Report’19 claimed that EU arrangements placed 
‘too much emphasis on the supervision of individual firms, and too little on the macro-prudential 
[risk]’;20 that the regulatory framework ‘lack[ed] cohesiveness’;21 and that there was ‘too much 
scope for different interpretations to commonly agreed goals.’22 Moreover, the Report identified 
a lack of openness amongst regulators during the crisis, resulting in policy-makers and regulators 
failing to exchange information and engage in collective decision-making,23 and it went on to 
criticize the crisis-prevention features of EU supervisors as ‘not fit for purpose.’24 At the 
international level, meanwhile, significant failures of global coordination were identified 
amongst international agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’), the Financial 
Stability Forum (‘FSF’) (since replaced by the Financial Stability Board (‘FSB’), and the G8 
(now replaced by the G7).25 In addition, governance gaps,26 weak global institutions,27 and ‘the 
absence of a global rule-making authority [capable of overseeing] global private financial 
institutions and processes’,28 were all blamed for creating an environment in which financial 
market risks were allowed to build up unchecked.  
It is suggested here, that underpinning many of these more targeted criticisms was the 
existence amongst policy-makers and regulators of a shared, but hubristic faith in the ‘self-
correcting nature of [financial] markets and the ability of financial institutions to effectively 
police themselves.’29 An instructive example of the way in which this ‘free-market’ ideology had 
become dangerously embedded within the culture of financial services regulation, is vividly 
                                                          
19 EU High Level Group on Financial Supervision (Feb. 2009) chaired by Jacques de Larosière. 
20 Ibid., para 153. 
21 Ibid., para 102. 
22 Ibid., para 108. 
23 Ibid., para 26. 
24 Ibid., paras 26 and 159. 
25 Ibid., para 31. And according to the Turner Review, ‘the IMF, like other institutions, failed to challenge what in 
hindsight looks like a clearly mistaken set of propositions’: supra n. 4, para 2.6(iii). 
26 Ian Goldin and Tiffany Vogel, Global Governance and Systemic Risk in the 21st Century: Lessons from the 
Financial Crisis 1 Global Policy 4, 6 (2010). 
27 Ibid., 7. 
28 Ibid., 6. 
29 FCIC Report, supra n. 3, xviii. According to Lord Turner, institutions ‘such as the IMF … set out a confident 
story of a self-equilibrating system’ based on ‘market completion as the cure to all problems’ and rooted in a broader 
‘belief system [which] tended to exclude the possibility that rational profit seeking by professional market 
participants might generate rent extraction and financial instability rather than social benefit’. Lord Turner, 
Reforming Finance: Are we Being Radical Enough? (2011 Clare Distinguished Lecture in Economics and Public 
Policy, 18 Feb. 2011). 
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illustrated by the remarks of Lord Turner, former Chairman of the FSA, in his Review of the 
crisis. There, he laid bare the Authority’s pre-crisis ‘intellectual assumptions about the self-
correcting nature of financial markets’,30 and the fact that the FSA’s regulatory and supervisory 
approach was based on ‘a sometimes implicit but at times quite overt philosophy which believed 
that … [m]arkets [were] in general self-correcting, with market discipline a more effective tool 
than regulation or supervisory oversight through which to ensure that firms’ strategies [were] 
sound and risks [were] contained.’31  
The degree to which this free-market ideology had suffused policy-making and helped to 
foster a climate that was instinctively sceptical towards regulatory intervention, is further 
illustrated by the now infamous exchange between former Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan 
Greenspan, and House Oversight Committee Chairman, Henry Waxman, before the House of 
Representatives Oversight Committee on October 23, 2008.32 There, Greenspan, a long-time 
apologist for the deregulatory and self-regulatory agenda that permeated so much financial 
services policy-making and regulation in the years preceding the crisis, admitted in his opening 
statement to the Committee, that: ‘those of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending 
institutions to protect shareholders [sic] equity, myself especially, are in a state of shocked 
disbelief.’33 Later, in questioning, Greenspan was asked by Waxman whether his ideology had 
‘pushed’ him ‘to make decisions that he wished he had not made.’34 In response, Greenspan 
stated:35 
GREENSPAN: [Y]es, I found a flaw, I don’t know how significant or permanent it is, but I have been very 
distressed by that fact… 
WAXMAN: You found a flaw? … 
GREENSPAN: I found a flaw in the model that ... defines how the world works, so to speak … 
                                                          
30 Turner Review, supra n. 4, 6. These intellectual assumptions are spelled out more fully in the Review at para 1.4. 
31 Ibid., para 2.7(i). See also Brian Quinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and the Financial Crisis of 2008 5 
NYUJL & Bus 549, 614 (2009); Maurice Stucke, Lessons from the Financial Crisis 77 Antitrust LJ 313, 314 
(2011); and Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets 2 Harvard 
Business Law Review 235, 237 (2012). 
32 The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the House Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong 2nd Session (Oct. 23, 2008) (https://house.resource.org/110/org.c-
span.281958-1.pdf). 
33 Ibid., 12. 
34 Ibid., 46. 
35 Ibid. 
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WAXMAN: In other words, you found that your view of the world, your ideology, was not right, it was not 
working. 
GREENSPAN: Precisely. That’s precisely the reason I was shocked, because I had been going for 40 years 
or more with very considerable evidence that it was working exceptionally well. 
Unsurprisingly, in the aftermath of the GFC, policy-makers and regulators have sought to 
jettison much of their flawed ideological baggage of old, and to rebuild their damaged credibility 
by constructing new, more muscular, regulatory and supervisory regimes premised on the 
capacity of these frameworks to withstand systemic shocks. The scale and ambition of these 
reform efforts are, in many respects, impressive. Broadly speaking, having initially taken aim at 
deficiencies in retail banking regulation and supervision,36 financial services policy-makers and 
regulators have, more recently, turned their attention to the ‘shadow banking’ sector.37 
According to Comotto, a leading UK commentator, shadow banking represents a form of market 
finance which ‘decomposes the process of credit intermediation into an articulated sequence or 
chain of discrete operations typically performed by separate specialist non-bank entities which 
interact across the wholesale financial market.’38 An important and increasingly high-profile 
facet of the shadow banking sector is ‘securities financing transactions’ (‘SFTs’), of which ‘sale 
and repurchase agreements’ —or ‘repos’—are the most well-known. 
This article sets out to explore and assess the scale of the challenges faced by policy-
makers and regulators in attempting to rebuild their tarnished reputations in the aftermath of the 
GFC. It does so through the lens of proposed (or recently adopted) regulatory measures designed 
to address a key vulnerability associated with repo transactions—namely, the maturity mismatch 
between the short-term liabilities of a repo borrower and its longer-term assets which has the 
potential to trigger a so-called ‘repo run’.39 In an important series of studies that have been 
                                                          
36 See, eg, the introduction of Basel III (which was designed to restore retail banks’ capital cushion), and various 
structural reforms aimed at segregating retail banking from investment banking. 
37 See generally, Financial Stability Board (FSB), Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation 
Recommendations of the Financial Stability Board (27 Oct. 2011); and European Commission, Green Paper 
Shadow Banking (Brussels, 19/3/2012) (COM(2012) 102 final). Financial Stability Board (FSB), Strengthening 
Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking: An Integrated Overview of Policy Recommendations (Consultative 
Document 2012). 
38 Richard Comotto, Shadow Banking and Repo (Report for the International Capital Market Association’s (ICMA) 
European Repo Council, 20th March 2012) (para 2.3) (emphasis in the original). 
39 The concept is widely associated with Gorton and Metrick’s seminal work on shadow banking, see, eg, Gary 
Gorton and Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 261 
(2010) (referring to ‘run on repo’). 
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highly influential in policy-making circles, Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick have contended 
that a repo run was a key component of the GFC.40  These studies have, admittedly, been 
criticized for offering an incomplete and partial picture of the forces at work during the crisis.41 
Evidence garnered by other commentators has revealed that in some repo markets – principally 
those backed by high quality collateral – haircuts barely moved,42 and that it was the collapse of 
the short-term funding of securitized asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) that represented 
the focal point for the crisis.43  
Nevertheless, evidence of some dysfunction in repo markets at the time of the crisis, as 
well as ongoing inter-connectedness and complexity within financial markets more generally, 
underscores the continuing existence of a key vulnerability within the shadow banking sector 
which today is (rightly) regarded as an important cause for regulatory concern.44 What is more, 
although post-crisis regulatory reforms directed at bolstering bank capital, in combination with 
unconventional monetary policies, have since had the indirect effect of reducing the excessive 
use of repos and of shrinking the supply of collateral available for repo transactions,45 the threat 
of a repo run remain credible. Most pertinently, the shortage of safe debt that the above 
developments have engendered is liable to result in the creation of new forms of short-term debt 
that are backed by supposedly ‘safe’ private (inside) collateral.46 As confidence returns to 
financial markets, repo cash-lenders are liable to become more sanguine about their attitude 
                                                          
40 See, eg, Gorton and Metrick, ibid., and Gorton and Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 
Journal of Financial Economics 425 (2012). 
41 Arvind Krishnamurthy, Stefan Nagel, and Dmitry Orlov, Sizing up Repo 69(6) Journal of Finance 2381 (2014). 
42 Adam Copeland, Antoine Martin, and Michael Walker, Repo Runs: Evidence from the Tri-Party Repo Market 69 
Journal of Finance 2,343, 2,344 (2014). See also, Benjamin Munyan, Regulatory Arbitrage in Repo Markets (Office 
of Financial Research Working Paper, 29 Oct. 2015) (arguing that runs were perhaps only the symptom of more 
general deleveraging rather than a run on repo and that more evidence is needed) (45). 
43 Krishnamurthy, et al, supra 41. 
44 See, eg, FSB, Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking Policy Framework for Addressing 
Shadow Banking Risks in Securities Lending and Repos (29 Aug. 2013); and European Securities and Markets 
Authority (“ESMA”) (No 1) Trends, Risk and Vulnerabilities 35 (2013).   
45 Jay Cullen, The Repo Market, Collateral and Systemic Risk: In Search of Regulatory Coherence in I Chiu & I 
MacNeil (eds) Research Handbook on Shadow Banking (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2018) 85, 1-4-109. 
46 ‘A shortage of safe outside collateral may incentivize the creation of excessively-complex credit securities, or to 
stretch existing collateral, to be used in SFTs.’ Ibid., 108 (citing John Geanakoplos and William Zame, 
Collateralized Security Markets Levine Working Paper (2010)). See also Gary Gorton and Tyler Muir, ‘Do New 
Post-Crisis Laws and Regulations Make the Financial System Riskier?’ (www.theclearinghouse.org/banking-
perspectives/2016/2016-q1-banking-perspectives/articles/do-post-crisis-regulations-increase-financial-system-risk) 
(2016) (arguing that when there is a shortage of government-produced safe debt, the private sector manufactures 
close substitutes). Significantly the IMF has already called for “some flexibility in the definition of acceptable safe 
assets”. IMF, Global Financial Stability Report (April 2012), 115.   
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towards such collateral, and, buoyed along by this upturn in market sentiment, may incline 
towards less rigour in their decision-making and increased collateral re-use than is in fact 
socially optimal. From this perspective, the prospect of a repo run remains a pressing regulatory 
issue – particularly where a sudden shock results in market wide retrenchment involving an 
inevitable scramble to unwind correlated positions. 
Set within the crucible of specific regulatory reforms designed to address repo runs, the 
article observes that both the absence of a ‘silver-bullet’ option, and the evincible weaknesses 
exhibited by each of the principal reform measures under review, underscores the existence of an 
inconvenient truth: namely, that there are very real limits to what regulation (of whatever stripe) 
can realistically achieve in preventing future financial market disruption in the face of significant 
correlated failures. 
The central and distinctive claim advanced on the back of this discussion is that, rather 
than reveal a clear case for regulatory optimism, policy-makers and regulators are today faced 
with a financial system which far-outstrips their ability to regulate it—and, in particular, the 
uncertain and unknowable frontiers of future systemic risk which lie dormant within it. Since 
there is much about today’s financial markets and financial regulation that is experimental, it is 
suggested that to assume that the risks that financial markets exhibit can be assessed and 
calibrated in any meaningful sense, is to replace one form of pre-crisis hubris (associated with 
policy-makers’ and regulators’ beliefs in the power of self-correcting markets), with a more 
modern, yet equally dangerous, form of post-crisis hubris (that is, the misplaced belief by policy-
makers and regulators in their capabilities to construct regulatory regimes which successfully 
cabin systemic risks and eschew the need for costly public-sector bailouts). It is suggested that 
such post-crisis over-confidence is not only liable to lull us into a false sense of security about 
how robust these regimes really are, but also to cause policy-makers and regulators to shirk some 
of the more difficult and fundamental questions which remain to be addressed. Crucial in this 
respect, is the need to determine what sort of financial markets best serve society, and what we 
are willing to pay for when things inevitably go awry again. While discussion of these particular 
issues lies beyond the scope of the current work, the fact that they are raised nevertheless helps 
to show us what ought to be our future direction of travel. 
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The discussion which follows seeks to explore the above ideas by explaining the key 
characteristics of repo transactions (Section 2) and the main problem—ie a repo run—to which 
they give rise (Section 3). The article then proceeds to explore and assess a number of regulatory 
options (both proposed or adopted) designed to mitigate the risk of a repo run (Section 4), before, 
finally, drawing conclusions—both specific and general (Section 5).  
 
2. What are repo markets? 
 
In essence, repos are a form of secured—or collateralized—loan, whereby a cash-borrower sells 
securities to a cash-lender, but agrees to repurchase the same, or similar, securities at a higher 
price at a future date (usually somewhere between one day and one month later).47 The price 
difference between the sale of the securities and their repurchase is referred to as the ‘repo rate’, 
and includes a fee paid by the cash-borrower for gaining access to the cash. The sale of the 
securities to the cash-lender represents the collateral ‘posted’ by the cash-borrower (eg a hedge 
fund) and provides a form of protection for the cash-lender (eg an investment bank) in the event 
that the cash-borrower becomes insolvent, or is otherwise unwilling to return the cash on the 
agreed date.  
It follows, therefore, that the quality of the collateral posted is critical to the smooth 
operation of repo markets.48 If excessive collateral is posted by the cash-borrower, the borrower 
loses the opportunity to raise additional cash or engage in additional leverage; by contrast, if 
insufficient collateral is posted, there is a risk that the cash-lender will be ‘out-of-pocket’ in the 
event that the borrower defaults on the agreement and the collateral liquidated does not cover the 
cost of the cash loaned. Accordingly, it is crucial that: (i) the initial collateral requirements are 
well-judged; and (ii) the lender continues to accurately value the collateral during the repo-term 
in order to identify whether it remains sufficient to cover the borrower’s liabilities. This is 
primarily achieved through two mechanisms. First, the lender imposes an ‘initial margin’ or 
                                                          
47 This section draws on Euroclear, Understanding Repo and the Repo Markets (March 2009). 
48 Comotto, supra n. 38 (‘collateralised funding, prudently managed, reduces risk at source’) (para 11.6). 
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‘haircut’ which serves to over-collateralize the repo cash-lender,49 such that the purchase price of 
the repo is less than the market value of the collateral posted.50 Secondly, the collateral posted is 
regularly valued by the lender during the repo period. If the value of the collateral increases, any 
excess capital is returned to the cash-borrower, whereas any deterioration in the value of the 
collateral results in a ‘margin call’ whereby the borrower is required to make available additional 
collateral to make good the reduction in the value of the assets initially posted—a process 
referred to as a ‘variation margin’.   
There are various perceived benefits associated with the use of repo transactions as a 
means of cash-lending. First, irrespective of whether repo collateral is merely ‘pledged’ (as is 
typically the case in the US) 51 or is transferred by way of an outright sale (as is the more 
common practice in the UK and Europe),52 in the event that the cash-buyer defaults on the 
repurchase agreement, the cash-lender is legally entitled to dispose of the assets to recover either 
some, or all, of the cash loaned. What is more, there is scope for the collateral to be redeployed 
during the term of the repo agreement for the purposes of selling it to a third party, or, indeed, for 
different repoing purposes—thus converting a cash-lender into a cash-borrower.53 That said, a 
party utilising collateral in this way is under an obligation to repurchase the securities, or their 
equivalent, so as to be able to return the collateral to the original counterparty. 
Secondly, provided the cash-borrower remains solvent, the cash-lender is not exposed to 
the risk of any depreciation in the value of the assets during the period of the repo. In other 
                                                          
49 Haircuts are expressed as the percentage difference between the market value of the collateral security and the 
cash to be loaned through a repo (so a haircut of 5 % means that a security worth £100 can be ‘repoed-out’ for £95). 
An initial margin is a percentage premium added to the market value of the security that is being offered as 
collateral in a repo or securities lending transaction. European Parliament, Shadow Banking – Minimum Haircuts on 
Collateral (Note, July 2013, IP/A/ECON/NT/2012-29. However, ‘[w]here the probability of default and the 
likelihood of having to liquidate collateral are remote, no haircut/initial margin is typically imposed’: Richard 
Comotto, Haircuts and Initial Margins in the Repo Market (ICMA’s European Repo Council, 8 Feb. 2012) para 3.8. 
50 Haircuts are seen as potentially useful in preventing the build-up of excessive leverage by acting in a manner 
similar to reserve requirements on deposits. Ibid., para 1.11 
51 Here, although possession of the asset passes to the other party (the cash-lender), ownership of the asset is 
retained by the cash-borrower. Accordingly, where repo collateral is pledged without the existence of a safe harbour, 
the cash-lender would be exposed to the vagaries of the automatic stay in the event of the cash borrower’s 
bankruptcy/insolvency.  
52 Here, the cash-lender acquires both the legal and the beneficial title to the collateral and, as a result, has a 
proprietary right in relation to the asset such that they are retained by the cash-lender in the event of the collateral-
giver’s insolvency. In such circumstances, the automatic stay has limited effect, since the cash lender has legal title 
to the asset and therefore has no need for a statutory safe harbour. 
53 Where collateral is pledged, the exact position is governed by the contract governing the pledge. Operational and 
regulatory limits also constrain rehypothecation.  
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words, if the value of the posted collateral deteriorates, it is the cash-borrower that bears the loss, 
as it is contractually committed under the terms of the repo agreement not only to repurchase the 
posted collateral on a future date, but to do so at a stipulated price (comprising the original sale 
price plus a fee for the use of the lender’s cash).  
Although the size of the repo market has shrunk significantly from its peak of 2008,54 
more recently, it has been estimated to be in the region of €15-20 trillion globally.55 There are 
many motivations for transactions of this nature, all of which are rooted in the belief by both 
parties—and, indeed, all other parties in subsequent transactions based on the initial agreement—
in some form of commercial benefit arising from the arrangement, such as liquidity management, 
hedging, or benefits from short selling. More broadly, such transactions are widely seen as 
helping to promote market completeness, through improvements in price discovery and 
enhancements to market liquidity.56 Furthermore, by helping to ‘mobilize the wholesale capital 
funding required by [retail] banks and other lenders’, repo markets are said to play a pivotal role 
in facilitating financial markets’ broader task of channelling funds from savers to borrowers.57 In 
particular, it is claimed that since repo markets provide an efficient and diversified source of 
finance for financial intermediaries, this ‘lowers the cost of financial services to investors and 
issuers’.58 In turn, this diversification is thought to ‘create[] a deeper and more robust market’, 
and, in so doing, to help reduce systemic risk.59    
In essence, therefore, the secured (or collateralized) aspect of the repo market seeks to 
reduce the risk associated with lending, making it an attractive arrangement for risk-averse cash-
lenders. Since this reduced risk leads to lower borrowing costs, it is not surprising that repos 
represent an important source of cheap finance and leverage for wholesale markets. However, 
notwithstanding the (widely-held) view that repo markets offer a number of benefits, there are 
                                                          
54 Bloomberg, The Repo Market (http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/the-repo-market). 
55 Richard Comotto, A Supplementary Note on the Systemic Importance of Collateral and the Role of the Repo 
Market (ICMA’s European Repo Council, 7 May, 2013) (para 4.8). 
56 Tobias Adrian, Brian Begalle, Adam Copeland, and Antoine Martin, Repo and Securities Lending Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports (Staff Report No. 529 Dec. 2011, Revised Feb. 2013) 1 
(www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr529.pdf). 
57 Ibid., para 1.2.  
58 ICMA, ‘FAQ: 3. Why is the repo market so important and why has the use of repo grown so rapidly?’ 
http://www.icmagroup.org/index.php/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/repo-and-collateral-
markets/frequently-asked-questions-on-repo/3-why-is-the-repo-market-so-important-and-why-has-the-use-of-repo-
grown-so-rapidly/ . 
59 Ibid. 
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increasing regulatory concerns about the potential fragility of repo markets and their ability to 
disrupt intermediation chains within the wider shadow banking system.60 And, as noted earlier, a 
number of studies now support the contention that a repo run was an important component of the 
recent financial crisis.61 The next section traces these regulatory concerns by identifying and 
exploring a key vulnerability within repo markets which has the capacity to trigger and 
subsequently transmit systemic risk by way of a repo run.  
  
3. The problems with repo markets: repo runs 
 
Since the use of collateralization in repo arrangements (via ‘initial’ and ‘variation’ margins) 
represents a routine and highly effective ex ante method by which a cash-lender may protect 
itself from counterparty default, in the vast majority of cases the interests of both the cash-lender 
and cash-borrower will be fully aligned and their respective concerns fully allayed. This is 
particularly the case where the collateral used is highly liquid, such as government bonds.62 
However, the use of initial and variation margins are by no means a ‘fail-safe’ way of ensuring 
that the collateral-taker is fully protected and that the financial system is rendered immune from 
systemic risk. Instead, since short-term collateralized loans are highly unstable during times of 
market turbulence,63 collateral readjustments of this nature have the capacity to trigger “bank-
like” runs—so-called repo runs—which disrupt the smooth operation of the shadow banking 
system, and, potentially, the traditional banking sector, too.  
The concept of a repo run is rooted in the identification of a key vulnerability which 
underpins the intermediation arrangement with which repos are associated: namely, the 
mismatch between the collateral-giver’s short-term liabilities (ie its obligation to repay the cash 
borrowed at short notice) and its longer-term (and sometimes illiquid) assets (which may be 
                                                          
60 See, eg, FSB, Securities Lending and Repos:  Market Overview and Financial Stability Issues Interim Report of 
the FSB Workstream on Securities Lending and Repos (27th April 2012). 
61 See sources cited, supra n. 40; however, see, sources cited, supra n. 42. 
62 It is estimated that around 80% of collateral in the European repo market is government securities: ICMA 
http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/short-term-markets/Repo-Markets/frequently-
asked-questions-on-repo/34-was-a-run-on-repo-the-cause-of-the-financial-crisis-in-2007/.  
63 See sources cited, supra n. 40.  
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difficult to sell for cash, or which are likely to be worth significantly less when sold en masse). 
Thus, in much the same way that banks ‘borrow short and lend long’, leaving them vulnerable in 
the event of a run on their deposits, any threat to the collateral backing the expansion in credit 
volume created by the repo, or, indeed any threat to the solvency of either counterparty, can help 
to generate—and, through interconnecting chains of complex and potentially opaque 
transactions, augment and subsequently transmit—systemic risk.64 Significantly, in a series of 
influential articles, Gorton and Metrick contend that, during the GFC, swinging repo haircuts on 
sub-prime assets gave rise to a form of contagion that resembled a traditional bank run.65 In their 
view, haircut increases are akin to the depositor withdrawals in a bank run scenario, and, as the 
GFC revealed, have the capacity to set in motion a form of forced deleveraging which further 
amplifies this trend.66   
The two (related) transmission channels for a repo run are: (i) a contraction in asset 
values (due to collateral dumping); and (ii) fears surrounding counterparty default. 
3.1        A contraction in asset/collateral values  
Shocks which adversely affect the value of repo collateral can cause collateral-takers/lenders to 
issue margin calls on existing repos, or to increase haircuts on new repo agreements. As a result, 
leveraged firms are required to provide more assets to cover any ‘calls’, and sell more of their 
assets to generate liquidity. In all likelihood, asset sales of this nature would increase the risk of 
more widespread panic-driven ‘fire-sales’. In such circumstances, assets would ‘trade at prices 
far below value in best use, causing severe losses to sellers.’67 Furthermore, increasing the 
supply of a collateralized asset at a critical time, and thus potentially aggravating price falls, 
could trigger a self-reinforcing downwards spiral, and set in motion yet further margin calls68 
and more extreme haircuts.69 More generally, where other financial institutions hold similar asset 
classes, and are required to “mark them to market”, additional downwards pressure is likely to be 
exerted on the market price of the assets in question. Any consequent unwillingness amongst 
                                                          
64 See, ESMA, supra n. 44. 
65 Gorton and Metrick, supra n. 40, 426. 
66 Ibid., 429.  
67 Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, Fire Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics 25 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 29, 30 (2011). 
68 Martin Oehmke, Liquidating Illiquid Collateral 149 Journal of Economic Theory 183, 184 (2014). 
69 Gorton and Metrick, supra n. 40.  
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other market participants to absorb the risks associated with buying and retaining such assets 
would, in turn, reduce the availability of reliable prices for collateral valuation and serve to 
exacerbate price falls. In the face of concerns about the ongoing quality of certain types of 
collateral (and/or counterparty credit risk)—as happened at the onset of the GFC—cash-lenders 
would be incentivized to sever credit lines and hoard liquidity, with the result that borrowers 
would encounter difficulties in ‘rolling over’ their short-term borrowing, notwithstanding a 
willingness to collateralize it. Starved of liquidity, the effect in the shadow banking sector would 
resemble a ‘run’ in the traditional banking sector—but without the ‘back stop’ of official 
liquidity support from a central bank. 
These problems are compounded where the assets subject to higher haircuts or additional 
margin calls are relatively illiquid or hard-to-value. According to Valukas, ‘[i]lliquid collateral 
requires longer time periods for sale at more uncertain prices, with time periods and prices 
dependent on the type of collateral, the amount of collateral to sell and [the] prevailing market 
conditions’.70 Since illiquid instruments are infrequently traded and have no public screen-price, 
the fact of selling such instruments is almost certain to adversely affect their price. In potentially 
febrile markets, this would further accentuate ongoing uncertainty with regard to asset prices. 
Furthermore, leverage—which is a traditional hallmark of repo markets—would have the 
capacity to amplify such problems, by making it even more difficult for collateral-
givers/borrowers to fund their positions and roll-over their debt. 
Even where the collateralized assets backing a repo are widely regarded as being of high 
quality, shock events can still adversely affect asset prices and reduce the value of the posted 
collateral. This is because, unlike assets traded in many other markets, the value of a financial 
instrument is difficult to determine and depends, inter alia, upon its expected future value.71 In 
determining where and how much to invest, investors may be influenced by factors that are 
unrelated to the future value of an asset. An example of such ‘noise trading’ occurs where 
investors, buoyed by a wave of market sentiment, continue to buy shares even after the market 
has experienced sustained price rises and has over-shot its equilibrium price,72 or continue to sell 
                                                          
70 Cited in Oehmke, supra n. 68, 184. 
71 Andrew Crockett, “Strengthening Financial Stability” in Philip Booth and David Currie (eds) The Regulation 
of Financial Markets (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 2003) 49; and Kern Alexander, Rahule Dhumale, 
and John Eatwell, Global Governance of Financial Systems (New York: OUP, 2006) 253. 
72 For example, in relation to dot-com stock. 
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unaware that the bottom of the market has already been reached. Furthermore, the means by 
which equilibrium prices are maintained in the financial sector operates in a way that is 
significantly different from other sectors of the economy.73 Somewhat presciently, as Crockett 
explained, as long ago as 2003:74 
[i]n the case of credit … an expansion in supply can, for a time, strengthen economic activity and boost 
asset prices—and, by improving the balance sheet position of both borrowers and lenders, it can sustain 
further increases in the supply of credit. Excess capacity and risk can build up unnoticed …. These 
problems are exacerbated by the fact that the leverage in financial intermediation can give rise to fragile 
balance sheets structures. The sudden and sometimes indiscriminate retrenchment of suppliers of funds can 
cause institutions and markets to be starved of liquidity, intensifying price declines and impairing the 
functioning of markets. 
In many respects, during the GFC, repo markets exhibited the tendencies Crockett identified.  
3.2.      Counterparty default 
Similar problems also arise where doubts surface with regard to the actual credit-
worthiness of a collateral-giver/borrower counterparty (and its ability to conclude the repo). In 
such circumstances, collateral-takers/lenders are likely to be tempted to ‘rush to the exits’ to 
liquidate the collateral that has been ‘posted’ in advance of other lenders motivated to react in the 
same way.75 As with cash-borrowers selling assets to generate liquidity, a glut of such collateral 
would depress prices further and, in all likelihood, exert self-reinforcing downwards pressure on 
asset prices. Again, where the collateral held by lenders is illiquid/or hard-to-value—or where a 
leveraged counterparty defaults ‘while holding positions that are large relative to the markets in 
which they have invested’—lenders seeking to offload such assets are more likely to hasten price 
declines by virtue of their attempts to sell.76 In turn, this increases the prospect of cash-lending 
counterparties—some of which may be systemically important entities in their own right, or 
linked to systemically important institutions—sustaining heavy losses.77 While, ideally, 
collateral-takers/lenders would prefer to unwind their positions slowly over time, in practice this 
                                                          
73 Crockett, supra, n. 71, 50. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Oehmke, supra, n. 68, 197. 
76 Ben S Bernanke, “Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk” (Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 2006 
Financial Markets Conference, Sea Island, Georgia May 16, 2006) 
(www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20060516a.htm). 
77 Ibid. 
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is likely to prove extremely difficult for two main reasons: first, balance sheet constraints in 
relation to, for example, capital, equity, or leverage, will limit the ability of lending 
counterparties to determine the speed at which positions are unwound;78 and, secondly, 
competition among holders of illiquid collateral is likely to incentivize such lenders to sell the 
illiquid assets quickly, in order to avoid lower asset recovery prices, as competitors seek to 
liquidate assets in advance of ‘crowded trades’, where multiple sellers rush to the exit at the 
same time.79 
All of the market adjustments outlined above, both to collateral and to accommodate 
increased counterparty risk, are likely to be motivated by factors which seem individually 
rational to the parties directly affected. Nevertheless, there is a clear risk that, at a more general 
level, such individually rational attempts at self-preservation will provoke a form of collective 
folly which serves merely to exacerbate the original problem. The result of this disjuncture 
between private and public interests would be to render the entire shadow banking network 
vulnerable to shocks. That is to say, while losses would initially be borne by the defaulting entity 
(and any of its adversely affected counterparties), in all likelihood these losses would not lie 
where they fell, but, via contagious runs, would spill-over—either directly or indirectly—to other 
interconnected entities within the shadow banking system, and, potentially, also to the traditional 
banking sector. 
 
4. Assessing the regulatory options 
 
In addressing the aforementioned concerns about the systemic effects of repo runs, regulators 
have either already utilized, or have available to them, a range of regulatory tools. Amongst the 
most important of these options, all of which are discussed below, are: (i) measures designed to 
increase transparency, with the aim of improving regulatory information-gathering and market 
discipline more generally; (ii) infrastructure improvements through the use of central 
counterparties (CCPs); (iii) improvements in collateral management associated with minimum 
initial margin/haircuts; and (iv) revamped bankruptcy/insolvency law arrangements involving the 
                                                          
78 Ibid., 188. 
79 Ibid., 185. 
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removal/displacement of so-called ‘safe-harbours’ and the potential use of ‘repo resolution 
authorities’. The purpose of discussing these measures is not to evaluate them vis-à-vis one 
another, or, to suggest, individually and/or collectively, that they are without merit. Rather, by 
focusing on weaknesses associated with the reform measures adopted or proposed, the aim is to 
shore up my claim that these reforms are emblematic of a type of post-crisis regulatory over-
confidence which imbues regulators with a misplaced belief in their capacity to construct 
regulatory regimes which can contain systemic risks. This is particularly the case in view of the 
fact that policy-makers and regulators are today faced with an increasingly complex and inter-
dependent financial system which, in its uncertain and unknowable frontiers of future systemic 
risk, outstrips their ability to regulate it in any meaningful way – especially when correlated 
failures occur. 
 What is more, the threat of a repo run remains notwithstanding the fact that recent 
regulatory reforms directed at bolstering bank capital,80 and the use by monetary authorities of 
unconventional central bank monetary policies, have had the indirect effect of reducing 
excessive use of repo and of shrinking the supply of collateral.81 The shortage of safe debt that 
the above developments have engendered is liable to result in the creation of new forms of short-
term debt which are backed by supposedly ‘safe’ private (inside) collateral.82 As confidence 
returns to financial markets, repo cash-lenders are liable to become more sanguine about their 
attitude towards such collateral, and, buoyed along by this upturn in market sentiment, may 
incline towards less rigour in their decision-making and increased collateral re-use than is in fact 
socially optimal. During times of market uncertainly, these private assets could lose their 
perceived safety in much the same way as value drained away from the privately created (inside) 
collateral associated with asset-backed securities (ABS) and mortgaged-securities (MBS) during 
the financial crisis. As a result, developments that have been characterized as significantly 
limiting the scope for a future repo run, could inadvertently result in increased repo market 
fragility. From this perspective, the prospect of a repo run remains a pressing regulatory issue – 
                                                          
80 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has developed (i) a regulatory minimum leverage ratio (LR) 
designed to address the build-up of excessive leverage; (ii) a net stable funding ratio (NSFR), introducing a stable 
funding requirement for short-dated securities financing transactions; and (ii) a liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) 
designed to help banks weather short-term liquidity problems. 
81 For a discussion of the way in which banking reforms and unconventional monetary policies have indirectly 
impacted on repo, see, Cullen, supra n.45. 
82 See, supra n.46 and sources cited therein.   
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particularly where a sudden shock results in market wide retrenchment involving an inevitable 
scramble to unwind correlated positions. 
 
4.1.    Transparency as a means of improving regulatory information-gathering 
and market discipline 
 
Rational decision-making by both regulators and market counterparties is hindered where 
markets lack transparency. Securities financing transactions (SFTs) are widely recognized as 
being complex, interconnected, and opaque.83 Since European regulators have been in the 
vanguard of efforts to improve market transparency in relation to SFTs—principally by way of 
the Securities Financing Transactions Regulation (SFTR)—this section focuses on the new 
measures within that jurisdiction.84 The SFTR, most of which came into effect on 12 January 
2016,85 seeks to address problems associated with a lack of transparency in SFTs in three key 
ways. First, it requires SFTs (including details on the composition of collateral and haircuts) to 
be reported to EU-recognized trade repositories so as to enable regulators to monitor the build-up 
of systemic risk in the financial system and, if necessary, to ‘take better-targeted and timelier 
actions’.86 Secondly, it provides for the ongoing disclosure of information by fund managers to 
investors whose assets are employed in any relevant SFTs. Finally, it mandates the disclosure of 
information to, and the need for the prior consent of, relevant counterparties with regard to the 
re-hypothecation (or re-use) of collateral in SFTs.87  
 As well as helping regulators to identify and assess, ex ante, the build-up of potential 
risks, improvements in market transparency is also likely to lead to improvements in market 
discipline. The availability of better-quality information is, for example, likely to enable cash-
lending counterparties to engage in better counterparty risk control by, inter alia, limiting 
agreements to entities with good credit ratings, calculating and monitoring credit exposures, 
                                                          
83 See, eg, FSB, Securities Lending and Repos, supra n. 60, para 5.1.   
84 Regulation (EU) 2015/2365 of The European Parliament and of The Council of 25 Nov. 2015 on transparency of 
securities financing transactions and of reuse and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. 
85 One exception is the implementation of a new reporting obligation which is to be phased in according to 
counterparty type. 
86 European Commission, Fact Sheet, Regulation on transparency of securities financing transactions and of reuse: 
Frequently Asked Questions (Brussels, 29 Oct. 2015). 
87 In essence, the SFTR enshrines in law a number of earlier FSB recommendations.  
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setting and adhering to risk limits.88 Well-managed market actors are therefore likely to be 
rewarded with more business, whereas those that are poorly managed are liable to be penalized.89 
In this way, the interplay of market forces is said to eliminate—or at least reduce—the type of 
suboptimal behaviour that can give rise to systemic risk.90 
 Yet, while reforms to improve transparency in SFTs may be regarded as an improvement 
on the status quo ante, they are unlikely to address the scale of the risks posed by such 
transactions.91 From the perspective of regulators, it is unlikely that the information provided to 
trade repositories will always be of sufficient granularity to enable the relevant authorities to 
make rational decisions in responding to events which generate systemic risk. In any case, even 
where this information is of sufficient quality, there is likely to be some element of time-lag in 
enabling regulators to acquire the level of knowledge necessary to undertake effective regulatory 
intervention. Furthermore, full-disclosure is not always optimal, since at some point the costs 
associated with increased disclosure will begin to outweigh the benefits.92 Knowing where this 
balance lies will be difficult to determine. Inadequate disclosure will lead to the build-up of risk, 
whereas excessive disclosure will impose undue costs on market participants. 
 From the perspective of market discipline, although the provision of better quality 
information to markets and market participants is likely to result in risks being more accurately 
priced, the effectiveness of market controls is predicated on the existence of standard neo-
classical assumptions associated with economically rational motivation, competitive market 
conditions (including, but not limited to, informed decision-making, and the absence of 
transaction costs).93 To the extent that these assumptions do not hold in practice, acute market 
failures are sure to remain.94 For example, cash-lending counterparties, such as prime brokers, 
are likely—notwithstanding improvements to market transparency—to continue to find it 
                                                          
88 See, ICMA: ‘15. Is Repo Riskless?’ (http://www.icmagroup.org/index.php/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-
Practice/repo-and-collateral-markets/frequently-asked-questions-on-repo/15-is-repo-riskless/ ). 
89 Hossein Nabilou and Alessio M Pacces, The Hedge Fund Regulation Dilemma: Direct vs Indirect Regulation 6 
William & Mary Business Law Review 183, 206 (2015). 
90 ‘[S]ystemic risk . . . is by definition an externality that internal procedures do not encompass and is not accounted 
for in the marketplace.’ Alexander et al, supra n. 71, 260. 
91 See also Steven L Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking 31 Review of Banking and Financial Law 619, fn. 103 
(2011-2012). 
92 Comotto, supra n. 38: ‘the extent of disclosure needs to be carefully considered, so that the regulatory value of the 
information gathered justifies the cost of reporting cost.’ (para 1.17). 
93 See John Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility (Oxford: OUP, 1993) 132. 
94 FSB, supra n. 60. 
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difficult to assess the trading strategies of borrowing counterparties and to value certain types of 
collateral, especially in relation to hard-to-value illiquid instruments. These difficulties exist not 
only in relation to calculating initial and variation margins, but also in relation to assessing wider 
counterparty risk.  
 Furthermore, insofar as a borrowing counterparty’s business becomes an ever-increasing 
source of revenue for cash- lenders, there will exist an incentive—at least in the short-run—in 
taking a more relaxed approach to assessing counterparty risk. In other words, any expectation 
that improved disclosure will significantly help to resolve weaknesses in market discipline in 
SFTs, is likely to prove misplaced if these entities are the primary beneficiaries of a borrower’s 
high levels of leverage and potentially overly risky—albeit profitable—trading strategies. 
 Finally, to the extent that a cash-borrower receives repo-financing from a number of 
different counterparties, collective action problems are almost certain to arise (especially where 
individual counterparty exposure is relatively small). In such circumstances, lenders will prefer 
that others (and not themselves) bear the full cost of any due diligence and risk assessment of a 
borrower’s risk profile. That is to say, counterparties have an incentive to ‘free-ride’ on the due 
diligence and risk monitoring efforts of others. The end result is, therefore, a general tendency 
for firms to economize on counterparty risk assessment and an overall erosion of the disciplinary 
effects of private monitoring notwithstanding improved transparency.  
 It follows, therefore, that although measures which seek to promote market transparency 
might produce some benefits in terms of aiding regulators to identify and assess ex ante risks and 
to improve market discipline amongst market-players, these measures are liable to fall short of 
ensuring the optimal internalization of the full risks associated with repo activity. The continuing 
presence of serious informational problems of the type discussed above, as well as failure of 
other standard neo-classical assumptions to hold in practice, makes it unlikely that the existence 
of market constraints will operate in such a way as to ensure that the private interests of market 
players are fully, or even adequately, aligned with the public good. This is not an argument 
against measures which seek to promote market transparency, but merely an acknowledgement 
that such measures are likely to be of limited value and that, accordingly, regulators need to be 
much less sanguine about the effectiveness of these tools in constraining the build-up of risk.    
 
4.2.    Improving market infrastructure: the use of central counterparties (“CCPs”) 
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A potential way of addressing some of the weaknesses associated with reliance on counterparty 
risk controls in repo markets is for regulators to require that repo transactions are cleared through 
a central counterparty (‘“CCP’, or ‘clearinghouse’)95—much like the new framework applicable 
to derivatives trades.96 Clearing trades via CCPs is said to create a more transparent and less 
complex set of exposures than would otherwise be the case with bilateral, over-the-counter 
(OTC) non-cleared trades. In essence, CCPs seek to contain and dissipate counterparty credit-
risk and, in doing so, to reduce overall risk in the markets in which they operate.97 Thus a CCP 
effectively stands as a ‘firewall’ between the defaulting firm and the contagion-like loss which 
threatens the wider financial system. In the context of repos, CCPs seek to do this by interposing 
themselves between the buyer and seller of a repo transaction, both of which are CCP members, 
so as to guarantee the obligations of each counterparty to the contract. Accordingly, if one 
counterparty becomes insolvent, the financial might of the CCP is deployed to ensure that the 
insolvent’s obligations are fulfilled and contagion averted. 
 The use of CCPs to clear repo trades is said to offer a number of important advantages.98  
First, as we have already seen, since many SFTs are widely regarded as opaque, mandating that 
they are cleared via a CCP would help to standardize trades and improve information flows.99 As 
spreads narrow and pricing becomes more accurate, repo-trading would become less 
expensive—thus potentially fostering more mutually beneficial trades.100  
 Secondly, by centralizing what would otherwise be dispersed, bilateral, OTC trading, 
mandating that repo-trades are cleared through a CCP would enable regulators to acquire an 
                                                          
95 See, eg, Paolo Saguato, ‘The Liquidity Dilemma and the Repo Market: A Two-Step Policy Option to Address the 
Regulatory Void’ 22 Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance 85 (2017). A CCP is a special type of 
clearinghouse. According to Regulation (EU) 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 
2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories—the so-called European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)—a CCP is defined as: “a legal person that interposes itself between the 
counterparties to the contracts traded on one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the 
seller to every buyer.” (Art 2(1)). In the academic literature, however, the terms ‘clearinghouse’ (or ‘clearing 
house’) and ‘CCP’ are often used inter-changeably. 
96 The G20 Leaders agreed at the 2009 Pittsburgh Summit that all standardized derivatives contracts should be 
traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through CCPs. 
97 Amandeep Rehlon and Dan Nixon, Central Counterparties: What are they, Why do they Matter and How Does 
the Bank Supervise Them? Q 2, June 13 Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 1, 2 (2013). 
98 See generally, Mark J Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence 101 California Law Review, 1,641, 1,658-1,662 
(2013). 
99 Ibid., 1,657. 
100 Ibid., 1,658. 
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overall impression of risk-taking within the relevant market and, if necessary, to implement a 
coordinated strategy which promptly addresses any emerging problems. 
 Thirdly, it is claimed that CCPs provide an arena in which counterparty-risk can be more 
accurately assessed and collateral more accurately calibrated so as to address those risks. In order 
to determine how much collateral is needed from a counterparty in a bilateral trade, a trader must 
assess both the market-value of the agreement and the counterparty’s credit quality.101 A single 
centralized player, such as a CCP, is said to be better-placed than individual counterparties to do 
this. CCPs are better resourced than individual firms and, by virtue of the specialized role they 
perform, are said to be both better equipped and have greater incentives to undertake accurate 
risk assessments than individual firms. From a CCP’s privileged vantage-point, it is able to 
survey the entire market and neutralize counterparty-risk by calculating the correct amount of 
‘initial margin’ required from each participating counterparty. This collateral operates as a ‘first 
line of defence’, since, if needed, it can be liquidated to cover any losses as a result of a member-
firm’s inability to perform its contractual obligations.102 In addition, since a CCP engages in 
ongoing risk assessments, it can issue margin calls to reflect any deterioration in the value of the 
collateral posted, and in this way combat the risk associated with having to liquidate assets. 
Thus, by demanding sufficient amounts of high-quality collateral from each counterparty at the 
outset, and by monitoring the value of that collateral and adjusting the amount needed on a daily 
basis, CCPs perform an important role ex ante in helping to prevent defaults from occurring, 
while at the same time remaining well-placed, ex post, to assume the contractual obligations of 
any member-firm that does default.  
 The fourth claimed benefit of clearing repo transactions via a CCP is that the CCP serves 
to ‘insure, mutualize, and thereby dissipate the risk’ that a single firm’s failure will adversely 
affect the viability of other interconnected financial firms.103 That is to say, by insuring and 
mutualizing—ie sharing or spreading—risk, CCPs help to stave-off wider systemic collapse. A 
CCP does this by absorbing counterparty defaults, thereby denying transmission of the adverse 
effects of defaults to the wider financial system and, in turn, the economy.  
                                                          
101 Ibid. 
102 Rehlon and Nixon, supra n. 97, 5.    
103 Ibid. 
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 CCPs have the capacity to absorb risk in this way because they may call upon a range of 
financial resources in the event of a counterparty’s default—collectively known as a ‘default-
waterfall’.104 Significantly, the order in which these resources are called upon ‘helps to create 
appropriate incentives for all parties (members and CCPs) to manage the risks they [incur].’105 
Accordingly, if the CCP is unable to ‘auction off’ the defaulter’s positions among surviving CCP 
members, it will have resort to the defaulting member’s initial margin and, if necessary, the 
defaulting member’s contribution to the CCP’s default fund—into which all members must pay 
upon joining the scheme. In the event that the defaulting-firm’s initial margin and default-fund 
contribution is insufficient to cover the relevant exposure, a CCP typically contributes some of 
its own equity resources towards absorbing the loss.106 The rationale for this so-called ‘skin in 
the game’ is to incentivize the CCP ‘to ensure that losses are … limited to the resources provided 
by the defaulting member rather than being passed on to other members.”107 As such, it is only if 
the CCP’s own contribution is insufficient that the losses are mutualized—shared—amongst all 
the other (non-defaulting) members. Finally, if ‘these loss-absorbing resources (which up to this 
point are all pre-funded) are exhausted … CCPs may call on surviving members to contribute a 
further amount, usually up to a pre-determined limit.’108  
 Mutualization benefits and the dissipation of risk are also strongly associated with the 
fact that participating CCP members, and, indeed, the wider financial system, are bolstered by 
the reduction in counterparty risk associated with the multilateral netting services performed by 
CCPs. These services simplify any outstanding exposures between participating market-players, 
by ‘offsetting an amount due from a member on one transaction against an amount owed to that 
member on another, to reach a single, smaller net exposure’.109 In performing this role, the CCP, 
via a process of ‘novation’, inserts itself into every contract between participating members, and 
thereby becomes the ‘buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer’. The operation and 
effect of netting in this context is explained by the Squam Lake Working Group:110  
                                                          
104 Ibid., 4.  
105 Ibid., 5. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
108 ‘In the absence of a mechanism to allocate any further losses among its members, the CCP’s remaining equity 
then becomes the last resource with which to absorb losses …. If losses exceed this remaining equity, the CCP 
would become insolvent’: Ibid. 
109 Ibid., 4.  
110 Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation, Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Exchanges  3 
(Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Geoeconomic Studies, Working Paper, 2009) (available at 
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Suppose … that Dealer A has an exposure … to Dealer B of $1 billion . . . . That is, if Dealer B fails, then 
A would lose $1 billion. Likewise, B has an exposure to Dealer C of $1 billion, and C has an exposure to A 
of $1 billion. Without a clearinghouse, default by A, B, or C leads to a loss of $1 billion [by one of the 
other two]. With clearing, however, the positive and negative exposures of each counterparty cancel, and 
each poses no risk to anyone, including the clearinghouse.  
 
In the event that the exposures do not cancel one another out neatly, as in the above example, 
netting can nevertheless produce a single net exposure.111 The clearing of transactions and 
netting of exposures, especially in the event of a member-firm’s default, to arrive at a single sum, 
in turn helps to alleviate liquidity pressures on participating members in times of acute market 
stress.  
 Yet, for all the claimed advantages of CCPs, concerns have nevertheless been expressed 
about their increasing use by regulatory authorities.112 Roe, for example, bemoans the current 
regulatory ‘infatuation’ with this form of market infrastructure, arguing that regulatory efforts to 
promote CCPs are ‘misguided’,113 and that they are ‘weaker bulwarks against financial 
contagion, financial panic, and systemic risk than is commonly thought’.114 Specifically, Roe 
claims that the effectiveness of CCPs in mitigating the risk that the failure of one financial firm 
will cause other firms to fail is overstated.115 At the heart of Roe’s critique of CCPs is his 
inversion of their most significant claimed advantage: that is, the ‘mutualization principle’, 
whereby risks are shared or spread within the CCP network so as to help stave-off wider 
systemic collapse. In this respect, although Roe accepts that mutualisation can in some instances 
help to neutralize risk, in his view CCPs do not always eliminate the targeted risk from the 
                                                          
http://www.cfr.org/financial-crises/credit-default-swaps-clearinghouses-exchanges/p19756) cited in Roe, supra n. 
98, fn. 68. 
111 However, since CCPs tend to specialize in particular financial instruments, this reduces the scope for netting 
across products, which is possible in the context of bilateral trades. ICMA: ‘Q 27. What does a CCP do? What are 
the pros and cons?’ (https://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/repo-and-collateral-
markets/icma-ercc-publications/frequently-asked-questions-on-repo/27-what-does-a-ccp-do-what-are-the-pros-and-
cons/). 
112 See generally, Roe, supra n. 98; Craig Pirrong, The Clearinghouse Cure (Winter) Regulation 44 (2008–2009); 
and Julia L Allen, Derivatives Clearinghouses and Systemic Risk: A Bankruptcy and Dodd-Frank Analysis 64 Stan 
Law Rev 1,079, (2012). 
113 Roe, ibid., 1,646. 
114 Ibid., 1,641. 
115 Ibid., 1,699. 
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financial system.116 Instead, CCPs merely serve to transfer that risk to other institutions—
typically those institutions outside of the CCP member-firm network—some of which may be 
poorly placed to bear it.117 In other words, although when a CCP member-firm posts high-quality 
collateral for a trade with another member-firm, this promotes risk-spreading, it also exposes 
non-member firms with which it trades to more risk. This is so because the collateral posted is no 
longer available to honour obligations that may be subsequently incurred by the member-firm to 
those outside the CCP network. Accordingly, unless institutions outside the CCP network are 
able to adjust for this risk by, for example, securing new credit-lines or sources of collateral, the 
risk of contagion is merely directed elsewhere within the financial system rather than eliminated. 
To the extent that these ‘outside’ institutions are themselves systemically important, or too-big-
to-fail, CCPs can act in ways which funnel contagion to other vulnerable, yet vital, 
institutions.118 
 Furthermore, Roe claims that although CCPs may be able to absorb and diversify away 
so-called idiosyncratic risk,119 risk-spreading (ie diversification) cannot successfully combat 
market-wide systemic risk when counterparty failures become correlated, as occurred during the 
GFC.120 Even where a CCP has previously rated collateral as AAA, recent events reveal that this 
is no guarantee that the value of such formerly highly-rated collateral will not deteriorate 
sharply. Put another way, there is nothing to suggest that CCPs will prove to be any more 
accurate than Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) at rating collateral quality.121 In so far as any 
system-wide shock adversely affects the value of widely held forms of collateral and provokes a 
wave of deleveraging by cash-starved firms, collateral sales by CCPs in response to member-
firm defaults are liable to exacerbate downwards pressure on prices. In such circumstances, 
CCPs are more likely to be part of the problem rather than part of the solution, deepening the 
                                                          
116 Ibid., 1,641. 
117 Ibid., 1,646.  
118 Ibid., 1,641. 
119 Since the default risk is mutualized, and thus spread amongst all participating members, it can be argued that 
CCPs actually have fewer, rather than more, incentives, to monitor the margins and/or quality of collateral used in 
repo transactions than would be the case in a bilateral repo. CCP counterpary risk assessments could also be 
compromised to the extent that a CCP’s private interests and public obligations are not sufficiently aligned. This 
could occur in situations where the commercial success of the CCP is reliant on a member-firm (or sub set of firms) 
whose interests may—at least in the short-term—conflict with the public good. Ibid., 1,695 and sources cited 
therein. 
120 Ibid., 1,677. 
121 Pirrong, supra n.112, 48 and 51.  
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adverse impact of fire-sales and adding to the ensuing panic.122 Consequently, from a regulatory 
perspective, at the very stage when the putative protection offered by CCPs are deemed most 
vital, by seeking to protect themselves from loss, they are likely to expose their Achilles’ heel by 
acting as a conductor for the transmission of risks. 
 What is more, in view of the fact that CCPs stand at the nexus of the market in which 
they offer clearing services, CCPs can, according to Roe, ‘easily gather, funnel, and expand 
systemic risk by pulling previously decentralized, discrete, and systemically containable risks 
into a single platform.’123 Thus, by acting as a magnet for risk before seeking to share it around, 
CCPs can themselves become ‘too-big-to-fail’ institutions. This simply moves the problem of 
bailout from one systemically critical arena (a vital financial institution) to another (a pivotal 
CCP), thereby augmenting problems associated with moral hazard in modern financial markets.  
 In sum, while CCPs are likely to function as efficient venues for repo transactions in 
ordinary times, at moments of acute market stress they are unlikely to provide the kind of 
‘backstop’ that has, to date, animated policy-makers and regulators to mandate their services in 
the context of derivatives trading. This is not to say that mandating the migration of standardized 
repo transactions to CCPs represents an obviously wrong policy choice.124 Rather, it is to suggest 
that despite the general effectiveness of CCPs in containing and dissipating risk in good or 
moderately turbulent times, they are in fact liable to exacerbate problems at times of acute 
market stress – which is exactly when regulators will have most need of them. In other words, in 
much the same way that the market-based finance associated with ABS and MBS helped to 
neutralize systemic risk in good or moderately turbulent times pre-crisis, but amplified it in times 
of acute market stress, so too are CCPs liable to exhibiting similar tendencies. To the extent that 
a form of hubris leads regulators to discount this weakness, there is a danger that the risks 
associated with repo activity will become under-priced that and that interconnected lines of 
transmission will become yet more pronounced.   
                                                          
122 ‘Greater use of CCPs means greater collective reliance on a limited range of risk management methodologies, 
which may synchronise reactions to news (eg changes in haircuts or collateral eligibility) and generate pro-cyclical 
shocks to the financial system. [Aggressive] haircutting by CCPs arguably had such an effect on Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain in 2011.’ ICMA, supra n. 111. 
123 Roe, supra, n. 98, 1,646. 
124 As part of its ongoing working on repo transactions and securities lending, the FSB has recommended that 
authorities should ‘evaluate the costs and benefits of central clearing in their securities lending and repo markets’. 
(Recommendation 12): FSB, Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking: An Integrated Overview 
of Policy Recommendations (Consultative Document, 18 Nov. 2012).  
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4.3.Minimum standards for the methodologies used to calculate haircuts and minimum haircut 
floors 
 
Notwithstanding a growing regulatory preference for the use of CCPs, many repo trades will 
either not be centrally cleared, or will not be suitable for central-clearing. Thus, such repo trades 
may—because of the market failures discussed earlier—be insufficiently collateralized.125 This is 
problematic inasmuch as the practice of setting haircuts is procyclical.126 That is to say, market 
margining practices results in the amplification of a trend—by increasing the supply of credit 
during economic booms (leading to the build-up of excessive leverage), and constricting it 
during downturns, at a time when access to funds is most acute. Proponents of this view contend 
that such procyclicality was evident both immediately before and during the GFC.  
 One initiative that is designed to ‘limit the build-up of excessive leverage outside the 
banking system and reduce the procyclicality of that leverage’,127 is the use of minimum 
standards for the methodologies used to calculate such haircuts, and the use of minimum 
numerical haircut floors for non-centrally cleared SFTs.128 The origins of these reforms lie in 
exploratory work undertaken by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS),129 and, more 
recently taken forward by the FSB.130 This has resulted in the creation, at the international level, 
of a new regulatory framework for haircuts comprising: first, ‘the use of qualitative standards to 
be incorporated into existing or new regulatory standards for methodologies used by all market 
participants to calculate haircuts on collateral received’;131 and, secondly, ‘[a] framework of 
numerical haircut floors, … apply[ing] to non-centrally cleared securities financing transactions 
                                                          
125 See, supra, n. 91 and accompanying text.  
126 Procyclicality refers to the amplification of an existing trend. BIS, Committee on the Global Financial System 
(CGFS), The role of margin requirements and haircuts in procyclicality (Paper No. 36, March 2010) 8.  
127 FSB, Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking: Regulatory Framework for Haircuts on Non-
centrally Cleared Securities Financing Transactions (Oct. 2014) at para 1 (http://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_141013a.pdf). 
128 See FSB, Consultative Document on Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking: A Policy 
Framework for Addressing Shadow Banking Risks in Securities Lending and Repos (WS5) (Recommendations 6 (on 
methodologies) and 7 (on minimum haircut floors)). 
129 BIS, CGFS, supra n. 126, vii. 
130 FSB 2014, supra n. 127, which specified the regulatory framework for haircuts on non-centrally cleared 
securities financing transactions (SFTs), and introduced a framework for haircut floors for non-centrally cleared 
SFTs (largely following the earlier proposal FSB in Aug. 2013). 
131 FSB, Transforming Shadow Banking into Resilient Market-based Finance Regulatory framework for haircuts on 
non-centrally cleared securities financing transactions (12 Nov. 2015) 4. 
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(SFTs) in which financing against collateral other than government securities is provided to non-
banks.’132 
 With regard to the use of qualitative standards for the methodologies firms use to 
calculate haircuts, regulatory authorities have been tasked with ensuring that haircuts are based 
‘on the market risks of the assets used as collateral and [are] calibrated at a high confidence 
level, using a long historical time period that includes at least one stress period’.133 In this 
respect, regulatory authorities are able to minimize the extent to which methodologies used are 
procyclical, and are to keep such methodologies under review. This aims to improve the quality 
and consistency of the setting of haircuts across the entire spectrum of securities financing 
markets. By seeking to ensure that haircut standards will be less likely to deteriorate during 
benign conditions, the FSB framework is directed at limiting the risk that haircuts will need to be 
increased during market downturns, and, thus, at mitigating the risk of more widespread and 
potentially destabilising de-leveraging. The introduction of qualitative standards is, therefore, 
expected to promote the adoption of haircuts that cover any potential deterioration in collateral 
values in the event that the collateral posted needs to be liquidated under volatile conditions. 
 By contrast, minimum numerical floors apply only to non-centrally cleared SFTs in 
which financing against collateral other than government securities is provided to non-banks.134 
In this respect, the new framework as it relates to numerical floors is much narrower than that 
which relates to the use of qualitative standards, since the latter applies to all SFTs, whereas the 
former applies only to a subset of such transactions. Where the new framework applies, 
counterparties must conduct their own assessment as to the appropriate level of haircuts, albeit 
that they are unable to set haircuts below the level prescribed. 
 Though contentious, the above reforms are widely thought to have two key advantages. 
First, it is claimed that mandatory haircut floors will help to provide a high minimum amount of 
financial protection for the collateral-taker/lender in the event that collateral-giver/borrower 
defaults, thus cushioning the adverse impact of the default. Secondly, minimum floors are 
believed to act in ways that are likely to constrain the build-up of leverage—and thus 
                                                          
132 Ibid. Originally this covered only banks to non-banks, but, following additional consultation, it has been extended 
to non-bank to non-bank transactions. Ibid., 2. 
133 Ibid., 4. 
134 Plans for the introduction of these proposals by national authorities are already afoot. 
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procyclicality—by requiring parties to post more collateral than they otherwise would if left to 
their own devices and, in doing so, ensure that suboptimal levels of repo-trading are discouraged.    
 However, these reforms have not met with universal approval. It has, for example, been 
argued that ‘a one-size-fits-all [approach to mandatory minimum haircuts] risks distorting the 
[repo] market’,135 and that the ‘terms of a repo are best set by market forces, responding to 
current market conditions and a multitude of other factors that regulations can never adequately 
capture.’136 It has also been suggested that notwithstanding the fact that the FSB treats the issue 
of haircut methodologies and the issue of numerical haircut floors separately, the use of overly 
prescriptive methodologies are likely to serve to create a de facto minimum floor. If true, this is 
of significance, since haircut floors apply only to a subset of SFTs, whereas rules relating to 
haircut methodologies are set to apply to all SFTs. According to the Investment Company 
Institute (ICI) and ICI Global (admittedly, both leading industry lobby groups with a vested 
interest in maintaining the status quo), the current market haircut norms already serve to ensure 
that haircuts do not fluctuate during periods of market turbulence, whereas the FSB’s new 
framework, by interfering with established market arrangements, is liable to ‘increase the risk of 
credit disruptions.’137  
 More significantly, it has been argued that the FSB’s new framework is based on a 
premise that is open to question, namely, the assumption that there is a link between the size of 
haircuts for repos and the amount of leverage and pro-cyclicality in the financial system (and, 
moreover, that the adverse effects of both were evident during the GFC). Although Gorton and 
Metrick found evidence of procyclical haircuts in bilateral US repo during the financial crisis,138 
Comotto contends that because their study focused solely on so-called “structured securities”, the 
implications of their findings cannot readily be extrapolated to the US markets more widely, and 
a fortiori to European markets.139 According to Comotto—at least in relation to high-quality 
collateral—the empirical evidence undermines ‘the hypothesis that initial margins/haircuts were 
                                                          
135 Richard Comotto, Haircuts and Initial Margins in the Repo Market (ICMA, Feb. 2012) para 1.8. 
136 Investment Company Institute and ICI Global’s Joint Response Re: Proposed Regulatory Framework for 
Haircuts on Non-Centrally Cleared Securities Financing Transactions (Annex 2 of Aug. 29, 2013 Report on 
Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking) (Nov. 27, 2013) (section 4) (hereinafter “Joint 
Response”) (https://www.ici.org/pdf/27734.pdf). 
137 Ibid. 
138 See, supra n. 39.  
139 Comotto, supra n. 38, para 1.8. 
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the principal driver of deleveraging in the crisis’140 Comotto further contends that if this is 
correct, then ‘the idea of mandatory through-the-cycle initial margins/haircuts to obviate the 
need for dealers to raise initial margins/haircuts in a crisis is clearly redundant.’ 141 
 Finally, it has been claimed that the use of numerical haircut floors are likely to be 
ineffective in addressing the putative leverage problem they are designed to address. According 
to the ICI and ICI Global’s Joint Response:142 
 
[L]ooking at repos … in a vacuum, any decrease in leverage that results from an increase in haircuts would 
be insignificant. For example, suppose a broker-dealer has $102 million of general collateral available for 
repo transactions. At a standard haircut of 2%, the broker-dealer could raise $100 million through repos 
using this collateral. If the haircut were increased to 4%, the broker-dealer could still raise $98.077 million. 
Thus, doubling the haircut on repos would result in less than a 2% reduction in the broker-dealer’s 
leverage.  
 
Since in reality firms may acquire credit through a variety of routes, any reduction in the amount 
of repo-trading which numerical haircuts cause will, in all likelihood, be ‘offset by increases in 
other, cheaper forms of credit.’143 Admittedly, the introduction of new balance sheet reforms  for 
systemically important financial institutions (in the form of more stringent capital and liquidity 
requirements) will, inter alia, reduce their reliance on repo—and thus help to curtail the build-up 
of excessive leverage—nevertheless, minimum mandatory haircuts are perhaps best 
characterized as a rudimentary regulatory tool in mitigating the threat of a repo run.     
 Many of the above criticisms of reforms associated with haircuts clearly carry weight. 
Yet, perhaps more worryingly, reforms of the type at which these criticisms are directed, embody 
a commitment to bringing repo-trading more fully within the regulatory fold. And although the 
animating rationale for these reforms may be a laudable and understandable desire to address 
concerns about procyclicality and the need to suppress excessive repo activity, regulators are in 
danger of bringing an ever-expanding range of financial activity within their purview, much of 
which, it is suggested, they will be ill-equipped to deal with in the event of widespread market 
disruption. 
                                                          
140 Ibid., para 6.8. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Joint Response, supra n. 136, Section 4. 
143 Ibid., Section 2. 
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4.4. Reform of bankruptcy/insolvency law and the potential use of repo resolution authorities 
(RRAs) 
 
A final set of reform measures are associated with revamped bankruptcy/insolvency law 
arrangements involving the removal/displacement of so-called ‘safe-harbours’ and, more 
radically, the potential use of so-called repo resolution authorities (RRAs). Currently, under the 
bankruptcy/insolvency laws of a number of leading repo jurisdictions – most prominently the US 
– repo agreements (and certain other financial transactions) are exempt from the ‘automatic stay’ 
which ordinarily applies when a debtor defaults.144 Accordingly, in the event that, say, the 
collateral giver becomes insolvent, the cash lender does not need to wait until the conclusion of  
bankruptcy/insolvency proceedings before enforcing their security. Instead, the collateral- 
taker/cash-lender is entitled to terminate the repo agreement, set-off any remaining mutual debts 
or other claims, and liquidate and collect any of the defaulter’s collateral which they hold. The 
rationale for this special statutory—‘safe-harbour’—treatment is rooted in the belief that by 
enabling repo counterparties to terminate contracts quickly, these counterparties can limit their 
exposure to the debtor’s default, and thus stave off their own insolvency.145 By affording legal 
certainty, the safe-harbour enables a collateral-taker/lender both to ‘close-out’ its positions with 
immediate effect so as to generate liquidity at the best available prices, and to re-hedge its 
positions with new counterparties.146 The potential ‘domino-effect’, where the failure of one vital 
institution causes the failure of another, is therefore contained, and the risk that contagion will 
‘cascade through the interconnected financial sector’ averted.147  
 By contrast, an application of the automatic stay would, it is thought, expose repo 
counterparties to a number of unique risks. In the event that repo-collateral was ‘frozen’ in 
general insolvency proceedings, the inability of the collateral-taker to close out the agreement 
                                                          
144 According to Paech, “[t]his approach is remarkably homogeneous across developed markets”: Philipp Paech, The 
Value of Financial Market Insolvency Safe Harbours 36 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 855, 861 (footnote 
omitted) (2016). 
145 See, eg, “Exploring Chapter 11 Reform: Corporate and Financial Institution Insolvencies; Treatment of 
Derivatives”, Hearing Before the H Subcomm on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H 
Comm of the Judiciary, 113th Cong 6 (2014) (statement of Seth Grosshandler) (available at http://goo.gl/QpTsgK). 
146 Edward R Morrison, Mark J Roe, and Christopher S Sontchi, Rolling Back the Repo Safe Harbors 69 The 
Business Lawyer 1,015, 1,024 (2014). 
147 Roe, supra, n. 98, at 1,652.  
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would make re-hedging difficult, since the underlying value of the collateral would be liable to 
fluctuate. Consequently, affected collateral-takers would be rendered more vulnerable to 
collapse, potentially triggering a wave of other counterparty defaults.148 The application of the 
automatic stay could also potentially exacerbate liquidity problems within distressed financial 
markets. In particular, solvent, but illiquid, firms would find it hard to roll-over debt, or find new 
counterparties willing to extend them credit. Absent a safe-harbour, creditors would fear that any 
credit provided would be used to clear the firm’s existing debt rather than serve to ‘back’ the 
new loan. The unwillingness of creditors to lend to counterparties in such circumstances could 
cause liquidity to drain away from the financial markets at the very time it is most needed. 
 The existence of a safe harbour is of acute significance where the repo collateral is 
pledged – which, as we have previously seen, is typically the case in the US. In such 
circumstances, although possession of the collateral passes to the other party (the cash-lender), 
ownership of the collateral is retained by the collateral-giver. Accordingly, were repo collateral 
to be pledged without the existence of a safe harbour, the cash-lender would be exposed to the 
vagaries of the automatic stay in the event that the cash-borrower entered into 
bankruptcy/insolvency proceedings. By contrast, in the UK (and Europe more general), since 
repo collateral typically involves an outright transfer of title which enables the collateral 
taker/cash-lender to assert its proprietary rights to the collateral, the automatic stay, and the need 
for statutory safe harbour protection, is of more limited significance.149  
 Interestingly, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, there has been growing support 
amongst a number of leading US scholars for a narrowing of the US repo safe-harbour 
arrangements. These commentators argue that the special treatment of repos tends to increase 
                                                          
148 Although the Bankruptcy Code provides protections to secured creditors, the mechanisms are not timely enough 
and are too cumbersome to obtain to effectively protect counterparties under volatile Safe Harbored Contracts, 
especially on a large scale, such as during the failure of a systemically important financial institution 
149 According to Benjamin, the protections afforded by an outright transfer of title to collateral-takers have long been 
recognized in English law, citing: Beckett v Lower Assets Co Ltd (1891), British Railway Traffic v Kahn (1921), and 
Chow Yoong Hong (1961), and, more recently, in Pearson v Lehman Brothers Finance SA [2010] EWHC 2914 
(Ch), AC [2011] EWCA Civ 1544 (RASCALS). Joanne Benjamin Lessons of LBIE: Reuse and Rehypothecation in 
Dennis Faber and Niels Vermunt (eds.), Bank Failure: Lessons from Lehman Brothers (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017) 171, fn.5. Bankruptcy style safe harbours are nevertheless a feature of the Financial Collateral Directive 
(FCD), Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral 
arrangements (OJ L 168/43) (Arts 4, 6, and 7). Furthermore, in implementing the Directive in the UK, the Financial 
Collateral Arrangements (No 2) Regulation, Art 12(1) provides that: ‘A close-out netting provision shall … take 
effect in accordance with its terms notwithstanding that the collateral-provider or collateral-taker under the 
arrangement is subject to winding-up proceedings or reorganisation measures.’  
 33 | P a g e  
 
rather than reduce systemic risk,150  and that in so far as special protection continues, it should be 
limited only to repos that are ‘backed’ by high quality collateral (essentially government-backed 
securities), and be denied to repo transactions backed by collateral that is risky or hard-to-value 
collateral (such as mortgage-backed-securities). Other commentators have gone even further, 
arguing that in the event of the default of a repo agreement backed by risky or hard-to-value 
collateral, but which is nevertheless of high quality, collateral-takers would be obligated to sell 
this collateral to a “Repo Resolution Authority” (RRA). The RRA would arrange for creditors to 
receive an immediate pay-out at market prices minus pre-defined haircuts specified by asset class 
by the RRA.151 Subsequently the RRA—which would be established in all jurisdictions with 
significant repo activity—would seek to liquidate the collateral over time so as to maximize its 
recovery value. The RRA would also have a right of ‘claw-back’ if the amount initially paid to 
the creditor proved overly optimistic. What is more, RRAs would levy an ex ante fee on repo 
lenders, and impose a set of eligibility criteria on them.  
 Antipathy towards the repo safe-harbour revolves around the adverse effects that the use 
of safe-harbours exert on financial markets.152 It is, for example, argued that the safe-harbour 
encourages an excessive amount of short-term financing, which is thought to be inherently 
unstable.153 All things being equal, in view of the fact that safe-harboured creditors are afforded 
better protection than non-safe-harboured creditors, this creates a market preference for the 
former type of funding over the latter.154 To the extent that vital financial institutions become 
reliant on such financing, they are likely to exhibit greater fragility—thus augmenting the too-
big-to-fail problem.155 Instability in repo funding resides in the fact that repos are “run-prone”; 
that is to say, any threat to the solvency of a repo counterparty is liable to cause safe-harbour 
privileged collateral-takers to terminate their financial contracts with the defaulting counterparty, 
and, as a consequence of cross-default clauses in other agreements, to provoke safe-harbour 
privileged collateral-takers in unrelated trades to do likewise. However, although the effect of 
                                                          
150 See, for example, Morrison et al, supra  n.146; and Duffie, Darrel and David Skeel (No. 108) A Dialogue on the 
Costs and Benefits of Automatic Stays for Derivatives and Repurchase Agreements, Stanford University Working 
Paper (2012). 
151 See, Acharya, Viral and T. Sabri Öncü, A Proposal for the Resolution of Systemically Important Assets and 
Liabilities: The Case of the Repo Market (2012).  
152 Even proponents of safe-harbours recognize that they raise the spectre of privilege and special interest pleading: 
Mark D Sherrill, In Defense of the Bankruptcy Code’s Safe Harbors 70 The Business Lawyer 1,007, 1,036 (2015). 
153 Morrison et al, supra n.146, 1,018. 
154 Ibid., 1,025, fn 37. 
155 Ibid., 1,027. 
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exercising these termination rights would be to channel assets from the defaulting firm to 
potentially vital safe-habour privileged firms (and, thus, to shore up the balance sheets of such 
institutions), the combined effect of the en masse liquidation of collateral at fire-sale prices 
would be likely to reduce its value and also to adversely affect the value of collateral more 
generally. The deterioration in collateral prices could, in turn, spread distress throughout the 
financial system, as firms scrambled to secure liquidity.156  
 In addition, it has been argued that the repo safe-harbour undermines creditors’ incentives 
to monitor the credit quality of their counterparties, since unlike non-safe-harboured creditors, 
safe-harboured creditors know they can seize collateral and eliminate—or at least minimize—
their exposure to the defaulting counterparty. In the years preceding the GFC, the presence of a 
safe-harbour arguably blunted creditors’ incentives to monitor the credit quality of 
counterparties. As Roe points out, the capital structures of firms such as AIG, Bear Sterns, and 
Lehman Brothers would probably have looked stronger had repo and derivatives counterparties 
not been afforded safe-harbour status.157 Furthermore, the existence of safe-habours can create 
perverse incentives for creditors to demand collateral irrespective of the impact that any margin-
call might ultimately have on the solvency of its already wounded counterparty. In this respect, 
the safe-harbour can incentivize collateral takers to ‘dismember institutions that [might 
otherwise] have been economically viable.’158 Indeed, as Roe claims in the context of US 
developments, ‘in 2008 the Bankruptcy Code’s superpriorities may well have pushed derivatives 
and repo creditors of failing financial firms to rush to cash in their claims and upgrade their 
collateral, which other [non safe-harboured] creditors could not do.’159 
 Whether the ‘disease’ which safe-harbours aim to address (that is, contagion-based 
systemic risk) is worse than the ‘cure’ (that is, granting privileged status to certain financial 
creditors) is, as some commentators have noted, indeterminate, since the supposed cure is also 
associated with a number of attendant dangers which threaten to undermine its original 
                                                          
156 The adverse impact of these “fire-sale externalities” is confirmed in recent empirical work: Fernando Duarte & 
Thomas M Eisenbach, Fire-Sale Spillovers and Systemic Risk (Fed Reserve Bank of New York Working Paper No. 
645, 2014) cited in Morrison et al, supra n. 146, 1,030, fn. 48. 
157 Marc J Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator 63 Stan L Rev 539, 
579 (2013). 
158 Jodie Kirshner, The Bankruptcy Safe Harbor in Light of Government Bailouts: Reifying 
the Significance of Bankruptcy as a Backstop to Financial Risk 18 New York Journal of Legislation and Public 
Policy 795, 822 (footnote omitted) (2015). 
159 Roe, supra n. 157, 565 (footnote omitted). 
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rationale.160 Tellingly, the FSB has stated, that while reform of bankruptcy laws and the creation 
of RRAs may represent ‘viable theoretical options to reduce the excessive reliance on funding 
through repos … and mitigate market disruptions’, given the existence of ‘practical 
difficulties’—in particular the need for fundamental changes to bankruptcy laws—the 
development of soft law norms on these issues is unlikely in the near future.161  
 What is more, it would seem that developments post-GFC have also limited the 
significance of statutory safe-harbours, 162 albeit that there remains some doubt as to the extent to 
which this will ultimately prove to be the case.163 Following a series of reforms of global import, 
henceforth all systemically important banks, investment firms, and, financial market 
infrastructures (such as CCPs), will face administrative “resolution” rather than 
bankruptcy/insolvency proceedings.  
 In the EU, for example, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)164 
establishes a comprehensive recovery and resolution regime for banks and investment firms 
based around: (i) the submission by firms to the relevant authorities of recovery plans; (ii) early 
intervention powers, enabling the relevant authorities to help distressed firms; and (iii) the 
resolution of failed firms so as to mitigate any adverse impact on the financial system.165 The 
broad effect of the BRRD, which has now been implemented into English law,166 is to impose a 
temporary stay on the exercise of close-out rights by creditors where a firm has entered into 
resolution. The purpose of the temporary stay is to promote ‘the continuity of a variety of critical 
economic functions that are dependent on maintaining counterparty relationships’ and, by doing 
so, to avoid ‘the rapid, disorderly, and potentially value-destructive closeout of financial 
                                                          
160 Ibid., 567.  
161 FSB, Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking Policy Framework for Addressing Shadow 
Banking Risks in Securities Lending and Repos (29 Aug. 2013) 18-19. 
162 Paech, supra n. 144, 879-881.  
163 See below infra n.176 and accompanying text. 
164 Directive 2014/59/EU establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and 
investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 
2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 
1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
165 Four different resolution mechanisms are envisaged: sale of the business, the use of a bridge institution, bail-in, 
and asset separation. 
166 Transposition has been achieved by a combination of legislation (see, principally, the UK’s special resolution 
regime (SRR), in the Banking Act 2009 (as amended)), and rules made by the Prudential Regulation Authority 
(PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). 
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contracts and liquidation of securities.’167 Thus, as Paech notes, the stay affords ‘breathing space 
… to allow the competent authority to evaluate the financial contracts of an ailing institution, and 
to decide which should be transferred to a healthy institution and which should remain in the 
ailing estate and be wound up.’168 Once this process has been completed, creditors may not 
revive their termination rights in relation to transactions that have been salvaged by the 
authorities—say, by virtue of the transfer of assets to a private sector purchaser or to a bridge 
bank—since there is no longer any need for the creditor to close-out.169 Rather, termination rights 
are only re-established ‘in respect of those contracts which remain in the now isolated “toxic” 
part of the estate which is destined to be liquidated by recourse to ordinary liquidation 
proceedings.’170 
 Likewise, in the United States, Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act requires, as a first step, all 
globally systemically important financial institutions (‘G-SIFIs’) to submit for approval to the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and the Federal Reserve so-called ‘resolution 
plans’. Meanwhile, Title II of the Act establishes a new Orderly Liquidation Authority (‘OLA’), 
the purpose of which is to provide the FDIC with the necessary powers to ‘liquidate failing 
financial companies that pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the United States in a 
manner that mitigates such risk and minimizes moral hazard.’171 In this context, the OLA is 
designed to function ‘as a complement to [the Bankruptcy Code], rather than as a stand-alone 
replacement.’172 In short, Title II provides for an expedited procedure for the FDIC to be 
appointed as a receiver for a troubled financial institution, and vests it with significant discretion 
over the way in the orderly liquidation is conducted.173 Specifically, the regime empowers the 
FDIC to transfer ‘qualified financial contracts’ (eg derivatives contracts), either to an acquiring 
investor or a bridge financial company.174 What is more, in contrast to the Bankruptcy Code’s 
exemption of qualified financial contracts from its automatic stay provisions, the OLA prohibits 
                                                          
167 Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Important, Financial Institutions (A joint paper by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation and the Bank of England 10 Dec. 2012) para 19 (emphasis added) 
(http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/news/2012/nr156.pdf).  
168 Paech, supra n. 144, 27 (footnotes omitted).  
169 Ibid.  
170 Ibid.  
171 Dodd-Frank Act s 204(a). 
172 Jodie Kirshner, supra n.158, 828.  
173 Dodd–Frank Act s 202(a)(1)(A)(iii). 
174 Dodd–Frank Act s 210(c)(9). 
 37 | P a g e  
 
counterparties from terminating such contracts, and, by retaining their value for the new entity, is 
said to preserve market stability and certainty.175 
 Although, potentially, these reforms impact significantly on the importance of statutory 
safe-harbours and private contractual arrangements, there nevertheless seems to be some 
divergence of opinion as to how exactly US and UK resolution measures will “play out” in 
practice—and therefore how far the protections afforded to collateral-takers by way of statutory 
safe harbours and contractual arrangements extend. For example, according to Paech, in view of 
the fact that, for certain types of financial institutions at any rate, resolution procedures have now 
replaced bankruptcy/insolvency proceedings, the “[i]nsolvency of systemically important 
financial institutions will … be a well-nigh-redundant concept [and] safe harbours will … remain 
relevant only to the counterparties of failing financial institutions other than banks, investment 
firms and financial market infrastructures.”176 This view is, however, contentious. In the US, for 
example, there is some suggestion that the Bankruptcy Code remains the “first port of call” for 
distressed firms, and that the OLA resolution regime applies only in exceptional 
circumstances.177 That is to say, it has been suggested that, properly interpreted, Title II of the 
Dodd-Frank Act prioritizes the use of the Bankruptcy Code over the OLA’s resolution 
procedures, resulting in an ongoing high-profile role for safe-harbours in that jurisdiction.178  
 In this sense, news of the demise of safe-harbours for systemically important financial 
institutions—at least in the US context—may have been exaggerated. However, on closer 
inspection, an explanation for the supposed disjunction between the respective positions in the 
UK and the US on the continuing relevance of safe-harbours in the light of the implementation of 
new resolution regimes in each jurisdiction, may lie in the fact that, in the US, authorities have 
placed more confidence in, and have given greater weight to, the concept of firms’ pre-emptive 
planning – ie Title I of Dodd-Frank. Thus, for example, according to Martin J Gruenberg, 
Chairman of  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: “[i]f … firms are successful in their 
resolution planning, then [Dodd-Frank’s OLA] would only be used in the rare instance where 
                                                          
175 FDIC, The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. under the Dodd-Frank Act, (2011) 5 (No 2) 
FDIC Q, 31, 38 (<http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2011_vol5_2/Article2.pdf>). 
176 Supra, n. 144, 881 (emphasis added). 
177 Thus according to Morrison et al, supra n.146: ‘Title II of Dodd-Frank and many of its key regulatory 
interpreters expect bankruptcy to be the first line of resolution defense, with the [OLA] processes kicking in only if 
bankruptcy fails.’ (footnote omitted) (1,043). 
178 Kirshner, supra n. 158: “Language in Titles I and II of the Dodd-Frank Act reserves the OLA for use only in the 
limited situations when existing bankruptcy law would be ineffectual.” (footnote omitted) (828). 
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resolution under the Bankruptcy Code would have serious adverse effects on US financial 
stability.”179 This suggests that US Bankruptcy Code safe-harbours would continue to apply—
even for systemically important institutions—provided their impact was not destablising (and is 
underpinned by an assumption that pre-emptive planning, as provided by Title I of Dodd-Frank, 
would facilitate this outcome).  
 On paper, recent efforts by regulators to construct and embed resolution regimes in the 
post crisis landscape are without doubt impressive. Although for the most part not animated by 
concerns about repo runs, regulators nevertheless hope that these measures will make repo runs 
less likely, and will mitigate the adverse effects of those which do take place. However, doubts 
about the exact relationship between bankruptcy/insolvency proceedings and resolution regimes 
– at least in the US – and the untested nature of resolution regimes more generally, illustrates that 
there is in fact much that remains unknown about how these new arrangements will ultimately 
fare when faced with the sorts multiple correlated failures that are characteristic of today’s 
modern, global, highly interconnected, complex and often opaque markets. In view of the size of 
some of the institutions likely to be embroiled in a future crisis, and the likely scale of their 
globaloperations, creditor incentives to simultaneously ‘storm the exits’ and liquidate collateral 
in advance of the use by authorities of their formal resolution powers, is almost certain to have a 
destabilising effect on both counterparties and markets generally. For good or ill, policy-makers 
and regulators need to face up to the fact that, in worse case scenarios, government-backed 
resolution—that is to say, outright taxpayer funded bailout—is simply inevitable, and that other 
measures, however well intentioned, which are liable to exacerbate stresses within the financial 
system at a time when the certainty of government bailout is required, are at best highly 
problematic.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
                                                          
179 See Implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act: Hearing Before the S Comm on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 
112th Cong. 82–88 (2011) (statement of Martin J Gruenberg, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) 
(http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spdec0611.html). 
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Whether directly or indirectly, financial markets play a vital role in helping to channel “funds 
from those with income in excess of their needs to those wishing to borrow”,180 and in helping 
contracting parties to ‘hedge’, or insure, against the risks associated with this process. In doing 
so, financial markets are said to help ‘service’ the financing needs of the ‘real’ economy and thus 
to help unlock latent wealth. As the GFC has amply demonstrated, however, to the extent that the 
activities associated with such markets impose uncompensated costs on third parties, the amount 
of financial services activity undertaken is regarded as suboptimal. Moreover, insofar as optimal 
levels of activity are impaired by market disruption, socially desirable projects are liable to go 
unfunded, causing economic activity—and, in turn, wealth—to contract.   
Much academic—and other—literature has explored the various causes of the GFC, but, 
unsurprisingly, a good deal of blame has been attributed to ‘regulatory failure’, and, more 
pertinently, to a regulatory philosophy which embodied a belief in the enlightened self-interest of 
financial institutions to act in ways which were consistent with the public good, and which 
asserted that ‘financial innovation, market completion and increased market liquidity [were] 
always and axiomatically beneficial’.181 It is suggested that it was the malign grip of this 
philosophy which meant that although regulators had ‘ample power’ to act, they conspicuously 
‘chose not to use it’.182 It is against such a background that this article set out to assess how, in 
the aftermath of the GFC, policy-makers and regulators—domestic, EU, and global—have 
sought to restore their damaged credibility by constructing new, more robust, regulatory and 
supervisory regimes which avert systemic crises. This process was explored through the lens of a 
high-profile facet of shadow banking, namely, repo agreements, which in certain policy-making 
circles are today regarded as having been a key component of the crisis. Here, policy-makers and 
regulators have been engaged in efforts to address a key vulnerability associated with repo 
transactions—the maturity mismatch between the short-term liabilities of a repo-borrower and its 
longer-term assets, which has the potential to trigger a ‘repo run’.   
In this context, the article assessed the merits or otherwise of a number of regulatory 
options which have been adopted (or proposed) in the context of repo transactions as a means of 
                                                          
180 Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions (Cmnd 7937), para 101, (1980). 
181 Lord Adair Turner, “Economics, conventional wisdom and public policy” (Speech by Chairman, FSA) (Institute 
for New Economic Thinking Inaugural Conference, Cambridge, April 2010). 
182 FCIC Report, supra n. 3, xviii.  
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mitigating the risk of such runs, and to draw broader conclusions about financial regulation and, 
in turn, financial markets from that assessment. In reviewing these options, the overarching aim 
of the article was not necessarily to advocate for or against any, or all, of the initiatives 
discussed, but to be candid about the dearth of effective options that policy-makers and regulators 
have at their disposal in resolving the problem of repo runs, and, in doing so, to underscore the 
significance of this for financial regulation more broadly. The analysis revealed that none of the 
policy options discussed represents the proverbial ‘silver-bullet’, and that both individually and 
collectively they suffer from acute weaknesses that are likely to limit their effectiveness in any 
future crisis.183   
Yet, notwithstanding a well-documented record of regulatory failings pre-GFC, and the 
equivocal nature of the merits of the regulatory options reviewed, policy-makers and regulators 
remain remarkably sanguine about their abilities to bring an ever-increasing range of financial 
activities more fully within the regulatory fold—and to subject this activity to more intensive 
ongoing scrutiny. While this expansive approach may not necessarily be regarded as unpalatable, 
it is, nevertheless, highly problematic inasmuch as it suggests that the risks posed by shadow 
banking in general, and repos in particular, can be effectively neutralized by the implementation 
of ever-more nuanced regulatory measures. Rather than provide a clear case for regulatory 
optimism, the discussion reveals a chilling and inconvenient truth: namely, that there are, in fact, 
very real limits to what regulation (of whatever stripe) can realistically achieve in forestalling 
repo runs and systemic crises. In this respect, there is a danger that the same so-called “hubris 
risk” (ie the risk of ‘blinding over-confidence’) that leading UK regulator Andrew Bailey warned 
the financial services firms to be wary of,184 will come to afflict financial market policy-makers 
and regulators. Put differently, there is a very real danger that policy-makers and regulators will 
repeat the mistakes of yesteryear by substituting their misplaced faith pre-GFC in the power of 
market discipline, with an ill-judged conviction post-crisis in their capacities to build regulatory 
                                                          
183 What is more, even where there is a consensus about the principled merits a particular policy option, practical 
difficulties—in particular how any new reform operates in the context of cross-border transactions—are likely to 
militate against their effectiveness, since much will turn on whether the reforms are implemented in harmonized 
manner. See, eg, Yesha Yadav and Dermot Turing, The Extraterritorial Regulation of Clearinghouses 2(2) Journal 
of Financial Regulation 1 (2016). 
184 Culture in financial services—a regulator’s perspective (Speech given when Deputy Governor of the Bank of 
England for Prudential Regulation and Chief Executive Officer, Prudential Regulation Authority) City Week 2016 
Conference, 9 May 2016 (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2016/speech901.pdf). 
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regimes which can cabin risks and, thereby, avoid the need for public-sector bailouts. It is 
suggested that such over-confidence is liable to lull us into a false sense of security about how 
robust our new regulatory regimes really are, and, moreover, that it is likely to deflect policy-
makers and regulators away from the real issue at hand: the more fundamental and logically prior 
question of what sort of financial markets we really want, and what sort of financial failures we 
are ultimately willing to pay for when things—inevitably—go wrong again. Failure to address 
these issues is not only likely to have serious implications for the future health of our financial 
markets, but for the hope of a fairer brand of capitalism, and therefore, for capitalism itself.   
 
